







to the demise of that ﬁrm and its auditor Arthur Andersen. But Enron was
notanisolatedcase, asotheraccountingscandalssoonfollowedatWorldCom
and Global Crossing in the telecommunications industry and at other promi-
nent companies in different sectors. In July of 2002, Forbes.com published
a “corporate scandal sheet” listing some twenty companies that were under
investigationbytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)orothergov-
ernment authority.1 Of these cases, the vast majority involved misreporting
of corporate earnings.
Theseallegationscertainlycreatedtheappearanceofageneralphenomenon
in corporate ﬁnance, and the resulting loss of conﬁdence in ﬁnancial reporting
practices arguably contributed to the weakness of markets for corporate secu-
rities. Thefactthatmanyoftheproblemsweresurfacinginindustriesthathad
been at the center of the new economy euphoria of the late 1990s contributed
to the sense of malaise by shaking investor conﬁdence in the economy’s fun-
damental prospects. In most of the recent cases, the discovery of accounting
improprieties was accompanied by a spectacular decline of high-ﬂying stocks
and, in a number of cases, criminal charges against corporate executives.
Consequently, the state of corporate governance and accounting became the
dominant business news story of the year.
To some observers, the recent events conﬁrm a sense that the stock mar-
ket boom of the 1990s was artiﬁcial—a “bubble” backed solely by unrealistic
This article ﬁrst appeared in the Bank’s 2002 Annual Report. It beneﬁted from conversations
with a number of the author’s colleagues in the Research Department and from careful and
critical readings by Tom Humphrey, Jeff Lacker, Ned Prescott, John Walter, and Alice Felmlee.
The views expressed herein are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Patsuris (2002).
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expectations with no grounding in economic fundamentals. According to
this view, investors’bloated expectations were nourished by the ﬁctitious per-
formance results reported by some ﬁrms. In the aftermath of these events,
Congress enacted a new law known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reform
corporate accounting practices and the corporate governance tools that are
intended to ensure sound ﬁnancial reporting.
Theattentionreceivedbythevariousscandalsandthelegislativeresponse
might easily create the impression that a fundamental ﬂaw developed in the
American system of corporate governance and ﬁnance during the late 1990s.
It does appear that the sheer number of cases in which companies have been
forced to make signiﬁcant restatements of their accounts, largely as the result
of SEC action, has risen in recent years. Beginning in 1998 with large earn-
ings restatements by such companies as Sunbeam and Waste Management
and with a heightened commitment by the SEC, under then chairman Arthur
Levitt, to police misleading statements of earnings, the number of cases rose
signiﬁcantly above the dozen or so per year that was common in the 1980s.2
While the frequency and magnitude of recent cases seem to be greater than in
the past, accounting scandals are not new. Episodes of fraudulent accounting
have occurred repeatedly in the history of U.S. ﬁnancial markets.
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, public attention and
congressional investigation led to allegations of unsavory practices by some
ﬁnancial market participants during the preceding boom. This activity led
directly to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934.
Oneofthefoundingprinciplesofthisagencywasthat“companiespubliclyof-
fering securities...must tell the public the truth about their businesses.”3 The
creationoftheSEC,however,didnoteliminatetheproblem,andscandalsasso-
ciated with dubious accounting remained a feature of the ﬁnancial landscape.
In 1987 a number of associations for accounting and ﬁnance professionals
organized a National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. The
commission studied cases from the 1980s and characterized the typical case
asinvolvingarelativelysmallcompanywithweakinternalcontrols. Although
incidents of fraud were often triggered by a ﬁnancial strain or sudden down-
turn in a company’s real performance, the companies involved were usually
from industries that had been experiencing relatively rapid growth. So while
thesizeofcompaniesinvolvedinrecentcasesmaybeatypical, theoccurrence
of scandals in high-growth ﬁrms ﬁts the established pattern.
Does fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting represent the Achilles’ heel of U.S.
corporate ﬁnance? This essay addresses such questions by examining the
2Alternative means of tallying the number of cases are found in Richardson et al. (2002)
and Financial Executives Research Foundation Inc. (2001). By both measures, there was a marked
increase in the number of cases in the late 1990s.
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problem of ﬁnancial reporting in the context of the fundamental problem of
corporate governance. Broadly stated, that fundamental problem is the need
for a large group of corporate outsiders (shareholders) to be able to control the
incentivesofasmallgroupofcorporateinsiders(management). Attheheartof
this problem lies a basic and inescapable asymmetry: insiders are much better
informed about the opportunities and performance of a business than are any
outsiders. This asymmetry presents a challenge that the modern corporation
seekstoaddressinthemechanismsitusestomeasureperformanceandreward
managers.
While the tools of corporate governance can limit the effects of the incen-
tive problem inherent in the corporate form, they cannot eliminate it. Ulti-
mately, there are times when shareholders just have to trust that management
is acting in their best interest and realize that their trust will sometimes be
violated. Still, management has a powerful interest in earning and preserving
the trust of investors. With trust comes an enhanced willingness of investors
to provide funds, resulting in reduced funding costs for the business. That
is, the behavior of corporate insiders is disciplined by their desire or need
to raise funds in ﬁnancial markets. This discipline favors efﬁcient corporate
governance arrangements.
As discussed in the next section, there are a variety of tools that a corpo-
ration might use to control managerial discretion, ranging from the makeup
and role of the board of directors to the ﬁrm’s relationship with its external
auditor. To say that such tools are applied efﬁciently is to say that managers
will adopt a tool as long as its beneﬁt outweighs its cost. In the absence
of government intervention, the forces of competition among self-interested
market participants (both insiders and outsiders) will tend to lead to an efﬁ-
cient set of governance tools. It bears repeating, though, that these tools do
not eliminate the fundamental problem of corporate governance. The obser-
vation of apparent failures, such as the accounting scandals of 2002, is not
inconsistent, however, with a generally well-functioning market for corporate
ﬁnance. Still, such episodes often provoke a political response, as occurred
during the Great Depression and again in 2002 with the Sarbanes-OxleyAct.
Through these interventions, the government has assumed a role in managing
the relationship between shareholders and management.
The ﬁnal sections of the essay consider the role of a government author-
ity in setting and enforcing rules. After reviewing the functions of the SEC,
discussion turns to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the provisions of which can be
classiﬁedintotwobroadcategories. Partsoftheactattempttoimprovecorpo-
ratebehaviorbymandatingcertainaspectsofthedesignoftheauditcommittee
or the relationship between the ﬁrm and its external auditor. The discussion
in this essay suggests that there is reason to doubt that such provisions, by
themselves, can do much to reduce fraud. Other parts of the act deal more
with enforcement and the penalties for infractions. These provisions are more4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
likely to have a direct effect on incentives. An open question is whether this
effect is desirable. Since reducing fraud is costly, it is unlikely that reducing
it to zero would be cost effective from society’s point of view. Further, it is
unrealistic to expect the new law to bring about a substantial reduction in in-
stancesoffraudwithoutanincreaseintheresourcesallocatedtoenforcement.
Given that it is in the interest of corporate stakeholders to devise mechanisms
that respond efﬁciently to the fundamental problem of corporate governance,
one might doubt that the gains from government intervention will be worth
the costs necessary to bring about signiﬁcant changes in behavior.
1. THE NATURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
In the modern American corporation, ownership is typically spread widely
over many individuals and institutions. As a result, owners as a group cannot
effectively manage a business, a task that would require signiﬁcant coordina-
tion and consensus-building. Instead, owners delegate management respon-
sibilities to a hired professional. To be sure, professional managers usually
hold some equity in the ﬁrms they run. Still, it is common for a manager’s
ownership stake to be small relative both to the company’s total outstanding
equity and to the manager’s own total wealth.4
Thisdescriptionofthemoderncorporationfeaturingaseparationbetween
widely dispersed ownership and professional management is typically asso-
ciated with the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. In their landmark
study, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means iden-
tiﬁed the emerging corporate form as a cause for concern. For them, the
separation of ownership and control heralded the rise of a managerial class,
wielding great economic power but answerable only to itself. Large numbers
of widely dispersed shareholders could not possibly exert effective control
over management. Berle and Means’main concern was the growing concen-
tration of economic power in a few hands and the coincident decline in the
competitiveness of markets. At the heart of this problem was what they saw
as the impossibility of absentee owners disciplining management.
Without adequate control by shareholders in the Berle and Means view,
managers would be free to pursue endeavors that serve their own interests at
shareholders’ expense. Such actions might include making investments and
acquisitions whose main effect would be to expand management’s “empire.”
Managers might also use company resources to provide themselves with de-
sirable perks, such as large and luxurious corporate facilities. These actions
4 Holderness et al. (1999) present evidence of rising managerial ownership over time. They
ﬁnd that executives and directors, as a group, owned an average of 21 percent of the outstanding
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could result in the destruction of shareholder wealth and an overall decline in
efﬁciency in the allocation of productive resources.
Theexperienceofthelastseventyyearsandtheworkofanumberofwrit-
ers on the law and economics of corporate governance have suggested that the
modern corporation is perhaps not as ominous a development as imagined by
Berle and Means. A ﬁeld of ﬁnancial economics has developed that studies
the mechanisms available to shareholders for exerting some inﬂuence over
management’s decisions.5 These tools represent the response of governance
arrangements to the forces of supply and demand. That is, managers imple-
ment a governance mechanism when they perceive that its beneﬁts exceed
its costs. The use of these tools, however, cannot eliminate the fundamen-
tal asymmetry between managers and owners. Even under the best possible
arrangement, corporate insiders will be better informed than outsiders.
The most obvious mechanism for affecting an executive’s behavior is the
compensation arrangement between the ﬁrm and the executive. This tool,
however, is also the most subject to problems arising from the separation of
ownershipandcontrol. Justasitwouldbedifﬁcultforownerstocoordinatein
directly running the ﬁrm, so it is difﬁcult for them to coordinate employment
contract negotiations with managers. In practice, this task falls to the board of
directors, who, while intended to represent owners, are often essentially con-
trolled by management. In terms of this relationship, management can beneﬁt
by creating a strong and independent board. This move signals to owners that
management is seeking to constrain its own discretion. Ultimately, however,
shareholders face the same challenge in assessing the board’s independence
as they do in evaluating management’s behavior. The close contact the board
has with management makes its independence hard to guarantee.
Another source of control available to owners comes from the legal pro-
tections provided by corporate law. Shareholders can bring lawsuits against
managementforcertaintypesofmisbehavior,includingfraudandself-dealing,
by which a manager unjustly enriches himself through transactions with the
ﬁrm. Loans from the corporation to an executive at preferential interest rates
can be an example of self-dealing. Of course use of the courts to discipline
managementalsorequirescoordinationamongthewidespreadgroupofshare-
holders. Insuchcases,coordinationcanbefacilitatedbyclass-actionlawsuits,
where a number of shareholders come together as the plaintiff. Beyond suing
managementforspeciﬁcactionsoffraudortheft,however,shareholders’legal
rights are limited by a general presumption in the law that management is best
positioned to take actions in the ﬁrm’s best business interest.6 For instance, if
management chooses between two possible investment projects, dissatisﬁed
shareholders would ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to make a case that management’s
5 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a survey of this literature.
6 This point is emphasized by Roe (2002).6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
choice was driven by self-interest as opposed to shareholder value. So, while
legalrecoursecanbeanimportanttoolforpolicingcertaintypesofmanagerial
malfeasance, such recourse cannot serve to constrain the broad discretion that
management enjoys in running the business.
Notice that this discussion of tools for controlling managers’ behavior
has referred repeatedly to the coordination problem facing widely dispersed
shareholders. Clearly, the severity of this problem depends on the degree
of dispersion. The more concentrated the ownership, the more likely it is
that large shareholders will take an active role in negotiating contracts and
monitoring the behavior of management. Concentrated ownership comes at a
cost, though. For an investor to hold a large share of a large ﬁrm requires a
substantial commitment of wealth without the beneﬁts of risk diversiﬁcation.
Alternatively, many investors can pool their funds into institutions that own
large blocks of stock in corporations. This arrangement does not solve the
corporate governance problem of controlling incentives; however, it simply
shifts the problem to that of governing the shareholding institutions.
In spite of the burden it places on shareholders, concentrated ownership
has won favor as an approach to corporate governance in some settings. In
somedevelopedeconomies,banksholdlargesharesofequityinﬁrmsandalso
participate more actively in their governance than do ﬁnancial institutions in
the United States. In this country, leveraged buyouts emerged in the 1980s
as a technique for taking over companies. In a leveraged buyout, ownership
becomes concentrated as an individual or group acquires the ﬁrm’s equity,
ﬁnancedthroughtheissuanceofdebt. Someseetheleveragedbuyoutwaveas
a means of forcing businesses to dispose of excess capacity or reverse unsuc-
cessfulacquisitions.7 Inmostcases,thesetransactionsresultedinatemporary
concentration of ownership, since subsequent sales of equity eventually led
back to more dispersed ownership. It seems that, at least in the legal and
ﬁnancial environment of the United States, the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation as-
sociated with less concentrated ownership are great enough to make ﬁrms and
their shareholders willing to face the related governance challenges.8 Still,
there is considerable variation in the concentration of ownership among large
U.S. corporations, leading some observers to conclude that this feature of
modern corporations responds to the relative costs and beneﬁts.9
A leveraged buyout is a special type of takeover, an additional tool for
controlling managers’ incentives. If a ﬁrm is badly managed, another ﬁrm
7 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) discuss the role of the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s in
aligning managerial and shareholder interests.
8 Roe (1994) argues that ownership concentration in the United States has been constrained by
a variety of legal restrictions. While this argument might temper one’s conclusion that the beneﬁts
of dispersed ownership outweigh the costs, the leveraged buyout episode provides an example of
concentration that was consistent with the legal environment and yet did not last.
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can acquire it, installing new management and improving its use of resources
so as to increase proﬁts. The market for corporate control, the market in
which mergers and acquisitions take place, serves two purposes in corporate
governance.10 First, as just noted, it is sometimes the easiest means by which
ineffective managers can be replaced. Second, the threat of replacement can
help give managers an incentive to behave well. Takeovers, however, can
be costly transactions and may not be worth the effort unless the potential
improvement in a ﬁrm’s performance is substantial.
The threat of a takeover introduces the idea that a manager’s current be-
havior could bring about personal costs in the future. Similarly, a manager
may have an interest in building and maintaining a reputation for effectively
servingshareholders’interest. Suchareputationcouldenhancethemanager’s
set of future professional opportunities. While reputation can be a powerful
incentive device, like other tools, it is not perfect. There will always be some
circumstancesinwhichamanagerwillﬁnditinhisbestinteresttotakeadvan-
tageofhisgoodreputationforashort-rungain,eventhoughherealizesthathis
reputation will suffer in the long run. For example, a manager might “milk”
his reputation by issuing misleading reports on the company’s performance in
order to meet targets needed for additional compensation.
Theimperfectionsofreputationasadiscipliningtoolareduetothenature
of the corporate governance problem and the relationship between owner-
ship and management. Any tools shareholders have to control management’s
incentives are limited by a basic informational advantage that management
enjoys. Because management has superior information about the ﬁrm’s op-
portunities, prospects, and performance, shareholders can never be perfectly
certain in their evaluation of management’s actions and behavior.
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCEASANAGENCY PROBLEM
Attheheartofissuesrelatedtocorporategovernancelieswhateconomistscall
anagency(orprincipal-agent)problem. Suchaproblemoftenariseswhentwo
parties enter into a contractual relationship, like that of employer-employee
or borrower-lender. The deﬁning characteristic of an agency problem is that
one party, the principal, cannot directly control or prescribe the actions of the
other party, the agent. Usually, this lack of control results from the agent hav-
ing superior information about the endeavor that is of mutual interest to both
parties. In the employer-employee relationship, this information gap is often
related to the completion of daily tasks. Unable to monitor all of their em-
ployees’habits, bosses base workers’salaries on performance to induce those
10 Henry Manne (1965) was an early advocate of the beneﬁcial incentive effect on the market
for corporate control.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
workers to put appropriate effort into their work.11 Another common example
of an agency problem includes insurance relationships. In auto insurance, for
instance, the insurer cannot directly monitor the car owner’s driving habits,
which directly affect the probability of a claim being ﬁled. Typical features of
insurancecontractssuchasdeductiblesservetoenhancetheowner’sincentive
to exercise care.
In interpreting corporate governance as an agency problem, it is common
toidentifytopcorporatemanagementastheagentandownersastheprincipal.
While both management and ownership are typically composed of a number
of individuals, the basic tensions that arise in an agency relationship can be
seen quite clearly if one thinks of each of the opposing parties as a single
individual. In this hypothetical relationship, an owner (the principal) hires a
manager (the agent) to run a business. The owner is not actively involved in
the affairs of the ﬁrm and, therefore, is not as well-informed as the manager
about the opportunities available to the ﬁrm. Also, it may not be practical for
theownertomonitorthemanager’severyaction. Accordingly,thecontrolthat
the owner exerts over the manager is primarily indirect. Since the owner can
expect the manager to take actions that maximize his own return, the owner
can try to structure the compensation policy so that the manager does well
when the business does well. This policy could be supplemented by a mutual
understanding of conditions under which the manager’s employment might
be terminated.
The agency perspective is certainly consistent with a signiﬁcant part of
compensation for corporate executives being contingent on ﬁrm performance.
Equity grants to executives and equity options are common examples of
performance-based compensation. Besides direct compensation, principals
have a number of other tools available to affect agents’ incentives. As dis-
cussed earlier, the tools available to shareholders include termination of top
executives’ employment, the possibility of a hostile takeover, and the right
to sue executive management for certain types of misbehavior. Like direct
compensation policy, all of these tools involve consequences for management
that depend on corporate performance. Hence, the effective use of such tools
requires that principals be able to assess agents’performance.
In the usual formulation of an agency problem, the agent takes an action
that affects the business’s proﬁts, and the principal pays the agent an amount
that depends on the level of those proﬁts. This procedure presumes that the
principal is able to assess the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. But the very same features of a
moderncorporationthatmakeitdifﬁcultforprincipals(shareholders)tomon-
itoractionstakenbyagents(corporatemanagement)alsocreateanasymmetry
11 Classic treatments of agency problems are given by Holmstrom (1979) for the general
analysis of moral hazard and Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the characterization of corporate
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in the ability of shareholders and managers to track the ﬁrm’s performance.
Since owners cannot directly observe all of the ﬁrm’s expenses and sales
revenues, they must rely to some extent on the manager’s reports about such
measuresofperformance. Asdiscussedinthenextsection,theproblemofcor-
porate governance is a compound agency problem: shareholders suffer from
both an inability to directly control management’s actions and an inability to
easily obtain information necessary to assess management’s performance.
Thecharacterizationofcorporategovernanceasanagencyproblemmight
lead one to doubt the ability of market forces to achieve efﬁcient outcomes in
this setting. But an agency problem is not a source of market failure. Rather,
agents’and principals’unequal access to relevant information is simply a con-
dition of the economic environment. In this environment, participants will
evaluate contractual arrangements taking into account the effects on the in-
centives for all parties involved. An individual or a ﬁrm that can devise a
contract with improved incentive effects will have an advantage in attracting
other participants. In this way, market forces will tend to lead to efﬁcient con-
tracts. Accordingly, the economic view of corporate governance is that ﬁrms
will seek executive compensation policies and other governance mechanisms
that provide the best possible incentive for management to work in sharehold-
ers’bestinterest. Theultimategovernancestructurechosendoesnoteliminate
the agency problem but is a rational, best response to that problem, balancing
the costs and beneﬁts of managerial discretion.
3. ACCOUNTING FOR CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
All of the tools intended to inﬂuence the incentives and behavior of managers
require that outsiders be able to assess when the ﬁrm is performing well and
when it is performing poorly. If the manager’s compensation is tied to the
corporation’sstockprice, theninvestors, whosebehaviordeterminesthestock
price, must be able to make inferences about the ﬁrm’s true performance and
prospects from the information available. If management’s discipline comes
from the threat of a takeover, then potential acquirers must also be able to
make such assessments.
The challenge for effective market discipline (whether in the capital mar-
ket or in the market for corporate control) is in getting information held by
corporate insiders out into the open. As a general matter, insiders have an
interest in providing the market with reliable information. If by doing so they
canreducetheuncertaintyassociatedwithinvestingintheirﬁrm,thentheycan
reduce the ﬁrm’s cost of capital. But it’s not enough for a manager to simply
say, “I’m going to release reliable ﬁnancial information about my business on
an annual (or quarterly or other interval) basis.” The believability of such a
statementislimitedbecausetherewillalwaysbesomecircumstancesinwhich
a manager can beneﬁt in the short term by not being fully transparent.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Thedifﬁcultyinsecuringreliableinformationmaybemostapparentwhen
a manager’s compensation is directly tied to accounting-based performance
measures. Since these measures are generated inside the ﬁrm, essentially by
the same group of people whose decisions are driving the business’s perfor-
mance, the opportunity for manipulation is present. Certainly, accounting
standards set by professional organizations can limit the discretion available
to corporate insiders. A great deal of discretion remains, however. The aca-
demicaccountingliteraturereferstosuchmanipulationofcurrentperformance
measures as “earnings management.”
An alternative to executive compensation that depends on current perfor-
mance as reported by the ﬁrm is compensation that depends on the market’s
perception of current performance. That is, compensation can be tied to the
behavior of the ﬁrm’s stock price. In this way, rather than depending on
self-reported numbers, executives’ rewards depend on investors’ collective
evaluation of the ﬁrm’s performance. Compensation schemes based on this
type of investor evaluation include plans that award bonuses based on stock
price performance as well as those that offer direct grants of equity or equity
options to managers.
Unfortunately, tying compensation to stock price performance hardly
eliminates a manager’s incentive to manipulate accounting numbers. If ac-
countingnumbersaregenerallybelievedbyinvestorstoprovidereliableinfor-
mationaboutacompany’sperformance,thenthoseinvestors’tradingbehavior
will cause stock prices to respond to accounting reports. This responsiveness
could create an incentive for managers to manipulate accounting numbers in
order to boost stock prices. Note, however, that if investors viewed earnings
management and other forms of accounting manipulation as pervasive, they
would tend to ignore reported numbers. In this case, stock prices would be
unresponsive to accounting numbers, and managers would have little reason
to manipulate reports (although they would also have little incentive to exert
any effort or resources to creating accurate reports). The fact that we do ob-
serve cases of manipulation suggests that investors do not ignore accounting
numbers, as they would if they expected all reports to be misleading. That
is, the prevailing environment appears to be one in which serious instances of
fraud are occasional rather than pervasive.
In summary, the design of a system of rewards for a corporation’s top
executives has two conﬂicting goals. To give executives an incentive to take
actions that maximize shareholder value, compensation needs to be sensitive
to the ﬁrm’s performance. But the measurement of performance is subject
to manipulation by the ﬁrm’s management, and the incentive for such ma-
nipulation grows with the sensitivity of rewards to measured performance.J.A. Weinberg: Corporate Behavior 11
This tension limits the ability of compensation plans to effectively manage
executives’incentives.12
Are there tools that a corporation can use to lessen the possibility of ma-
nipulated reporting and thereby improve the incentive structure for corporate
executives? One possible tool is an external check on a ﬁrm’s reported perfor-
mance. A primary source for this check in public corporations is an external
auditor. By becoming familiar with a client and its performance, an auditor
can get a sense for the appropriateness of the choices made by the ﬁrm in
preparing its reports. Of course, every case of fraudulent ﬁnancial report-
ing by corporations, including those in the last year, involves the failure of
an external auditor to detect or disclose problems. Clearly, an external audit
is not a fail-safe protection against misreporting. A signiﬁcant part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was therefore devoted to improving the incentives
of accounting ﬁrms in their role as external auditors.
An external audit is limited in its ability to prevent fraudulent reporting.
First, many observers argue that an auditor’s role is limited to certifying that
a client’s ﬁnancial statements were prepared in accordance with professional
accounting standards. Making this determination does not automatically en-
able an auditor to identify fraud. Others counter that an auditor’s knowledge
ofaclient’soperationsmakestheauditorbetterpositionedthanotheroutsiders
to assess the veracity of the client’s reports. In this view, audit effectiveness
in deterring fraud is as much a matter of willingness as ability.
Oneaspectofauditors’incentivesthathasreceivedagreatdealofattention
isthedegreetowhichtheauditor’sinterestsareindependentoftheinterestsof
the client’s management.13 Some observers argue that the objectivity of large
accountingﬁrmswhenservingasexternalauditorsiscompromisedbyadesire
to gain and retain lucrative consulting relationships with those clients. Even
before the events of 2002, momentum was growing for the idea of separating
theauditandconsultingbusinessesintoseparateﬁrms. AlthoughtheSarbanes-
Oxley Act did not require such a separation, some audit ﬁrms have taken the
step of spinning off their consulting businesses. This step, however, does not
guarantee auditor independence. Ultimately, an auditor works for its client,
and there are always strong market forces driving a service provider to give
the client what the client wants. If the client is willing to pay more for an
audit that overlooks some questionable numbers than the (expected) costs to
theauditorforprovidingsuchanaudit, thenthatdemandwilllikelybemet. In
general, a client’s desire to maintain credibility with investors gives it a strong
interest in the reliability of the auditor’s work. Even so, there will always be
12 Lacker and Weinberg (1989) analyze an agency problem in which the agent can manipulate
the performance measure.
13 Levitt (2000) discusses this point.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
some cases in which a client and an auditor ﬁnd themselves willing to breach
the public’s trust for a short-term gain.
Some observers suggest that making the hiring of the auditor the respon-
sibility of a company’s board of directors, in particular the board’s audit com-
mittee, can prevent complicity between management and external auditors.
This arrangement is indeed a standard procedure in large corporations. Still,
the ability of such an arrangement to enhance auditor independence hinges on
the independence of the board and its audit committee. Unfortunately, there
appears to be no simple mechanism for ensuring the independence of direc-
torschargedwithoverseeingaﬁrm’sauditrelationships. In1987theNational
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting found that among the most
common characteristics of cases that resulted in enforcement actions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission was weak or inactive audit committees
or committees that had members with business ties to the ﬁrm or its execu-
tives. While such characteristics can often be seen clearly after the fact, it can
be more difﬁcult and costly for investors or other outsiders to discriminate
among ﬁrms based on the general quality of their governance arrangements
before problems have surfaced. While an outside investor can learn about the
membersoftheauditcommitteeandhowoftenitmeets, investorsarelessable
to assess how much care the committee puts into its work.
The difﬁculty in guaranteeing the release of reliable information arises
directly from the fundamental problem of corporate governance. In a busi-
ness enterprise characterized by a separation of ownership and control, those
in control have exclusive access to information that would be useful to the
outside owners of the ﬁrm. Any outsider that the ﬁrm hires to verify that
the information it releases is correct becomes, in effect, an insider. Once an
auditor, for instance, acquires sufﬁcient knowledge about a client to assess
its management’s reports, that auditor faces incentive problems analogous to
those faced by management. So, while an external audit might be part of
the appropriate response to the agency problem between management and in-
vestors, an audit also creates a new and analogous agency problem between
investors and an auditor.
An alternative approach to monitoring the information released by a ﬁrm
is for this monitoring to be done by parties that have no contractual relation-
ship with the ﬁrm’s management. Investors, as a group, would beneﬁt from
the increased credibility of accounting numbers this situation would provide.
Suppose that a small number of individual investors spent the resources nec-
essary to assess the truthfulness of a ﬁrm’s report. Those investors could then
make trades based on the results of their investigation. In an efﬁcient capital
market, the results would then be revealed in the ﬁrm’s stock price. In this
way, the ﬁrm’s management would suffer the consequences (in the form of
a lower stock price) of making misleading reports. The problem with this
scenario is that while only a few investors incur the cost of the investigationJ.A. Weinberg: Corporate Behavior 13
and producing the information, all investors receive the beneﬁt. Individual
investorswillhavealimitedincentivetoincursuchcostswhenotherinvestors
can free ride on their efforts. Because it is difﬁcult for dispersed shareholders
to coordinate information-gathering efforts, such free riding might occur and
isjustafurtherreﬂectionofthefundamentalproblemofcorporategovernance.
The free-riding problem that comes when investors produce information
about a ﬁrm can be reduced if an individual investor owns a large fraction of
a ﬁrm’s shares. As discussed in the second section, however, concentrated
ownership has costs and does not necessarily resolve the information and in-
centiveproblemsinherentincorporategovernance. Analternativeapproachto
the free-riding problem, and one that extends beyond the governance arrange-
ments of an individual ﬁrm, is the creation of a membership organization that
evaluates ﬁrms and their reporting behavior. Firms would be willing to pay
a fee to join such an organization if membership served as a seal of approval
for reporting practices. Members would then enjoy the beneﬁts of reduced
funding costs that come with credibility.
Onetypeofmembershiporganizationthatcouldcontributetoimprovedﬁ-
nancial reporting is a stock exchange. As the next section discusses, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was a leader in establishing disclosure rules
prior to the stock market crash of 1929. The political response to the crash
wasthecreationoftheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission,whichtookover
some of the responsibilities that might otherwise fall to a private membership
organization. Hence, a government body like the SEC might substitute for
private arrangements in monitoring corporate accounting behavior. The main
source of incentives for a government body is its sensitivity to political sen-
timents. While political pressure can be an effective source of incentives, its
effectiveness can also vary depending on political and economic conditions.
If government monitoring replaces some information production by private
market participants, it is still possible for such a hybrid system of corporate
monitoring to be efﬁcient as long as market participants base their actions on
accurate beliefs about the effectiveness of government monitoring.
Given the existence of a governmental entity charged with policing the
accounting behavior of public corporations, how much policing should that
entitydo? Shoulditcarefullyinvestigateeveryﬁrm’sreportednumbers? This
would be an expensive undertaking. The purpose of this policing activity is
to enhance the incentives for corporate managements and their auditors to ﬁle
accurate reports. At the same time, this goal should be pursued in a cost-
effective manner. To do this, there is a second tool, beyond investigation, that
the agency can use to affect incentives. The agency can also vary the punish-
ment imposed on ﬁrms that are found to have violated the standards of honest
reporting. At a minimum, this punishment simply involves the reduction in
stockpricethatoccurswhenaﬁrmisforcedtomakearestatementofearnings
or other important accounting numbers. This minimum punishment, imposed14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
entirely by market forces, can be substantial.14 To toughen punishment, the
government authority can impose ﬁnes or even criminal penalties.
To increase corporate managers’incentive for truthful accounting, a gov-
ernment authority can either increase resources spent on monitoring ﬁrms’
reports or increase penalties imposed for discovered infractions. Relying on
large penalties allows the authority to economize on monitoring costs but, as
long as monitoring is imperfect, raises the likelihood of wrongly penalizing
ﬁrms. TheSarbanes-OxleyActhasprovisionsthataffectbothofthesemargins
of enforcement. The following sections describe enforcement in the United
States before and after Sarbanes-Oxley.
4. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE
HONESTY
Before the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934,
regulation of disclosures by ﬁrms issuing public securities was a state matter.
Various states had “blue sky laws,” so named because they were intended to
“check stock swindlers so barefaced they would sell building lots in the blue
sky.”15 These laws, which speciﬁed disclosures required of ﬁrms seeking to
register and issue securities, had limited impact because they did not apply to
the issuance of securities across state lines. An issuer could register securities
in one state but offer them for sale in other states through the mail. The issuer
would then be subject only to the laws of the state in which the securities
wereregistered. TheNewYorkStockExchangeofferedanalternative, private
formofregulationwithlistingrequirementsthatweregenerallymorestringent
than those in the state laws. The NYSE also encouraged listing ﬁrms to make
regular, audited reports on their income and ﬁnancial position. This practice
was nearly universal on the NewYork Stock Exchange by the late 1920s. The
many competing exchanges at the time had weaker rules.
One of the key provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was a
requirement that all ﬁrms issuing stock ﬁle annual and quarterly reports with
the SEC. In general, however, the act did not give ﬁnely detailed instructions
to the commission. Rather, the SEC was granted the authority to issue rules
“where appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”16
As with many of its powers, the SEC’s authority with regard to the treatment
of information disclosed by ﬁrms was left to an evolutionary process.
In the form into which it has evolved, the SEC reviews ﬁnancial reports,
taking one of a number of possible actions when problems are found. There
are two broad classes of ﬁlings that the Corporate Finance Division of the
14 Richardson et al. (2002).
15 Seligman (1982, 44).
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SECreviews—transactionalandperiodicﬁlings. Transactionalﬁlingscontain
information relevant to particular transactions, such as the issuance of new
securities or mergers and acquisitions. Periodic ﬁlings are the annual and
quarterly ﬁlings, as well as the annual report to shareholders. Among the
options available to the Corporate Finance Division if problems are found in
a ﬁrm’s disclosures is to refer the case to the Division of Enforcement.
Given its limited resources, it is impossible for the SEC to review all
of the ﬁlings that come under its authority. In general, more attention is
paid to transactional ﬁlings. In particular, all transactional ﬁlings go through
an initial review, or screening process, to identify those warranting a closer
examination. Many periodic ﬁlings do not even receive the initial screening.
While the agency’s goal has been to review every ﬁrm’s annual 10-K report at
leastonceeverythreeyears, ithasnothadtheresourcestorealizethatgoal. In
2002 around half of all public companies had not had such a review in the last
three years.17 It is possible that the extraordinary nature of recent scandals
has been due in part to the failure of the SEC’s enforcement capabilities to
keep up with the growth of securities market activity.
5. THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002
In the aftermath of the accounting scandals of 2002, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct, aimed at enhancing corporate responsibility and reform-
ing the practice of corporate accounting. The law contains provisions pertain-
ing to both companies issuing securities and those in the auditing profession.
Some parts of the act articulate rules for companies and their auditors, while
other parts focus more on enforcement of these rules.18
The most prominent provisions dealing with companies that issue secu-
rities include obligations for the top executives and rules regarding the audit
committee. The act requires the chief executive and ﬁnancial ofﬁcers to sign a
ﬁrm’s annual and quarterly ﬁlings with the SEC. The signatures will be taken
to certify that, to the best of the executives’knowledge, the ﬁlings give a fair
and honest representation of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition and operating per-
formance. By not fulﬁlling this signature requirement, executives could face
the possibility of signiﬁcant criminal penalties.
The sections of the act that deal with the audit committee seek to pro-
mote the independence of directors serving on that committee. To this end,
the act requires that members of the audit committee have no other business
relationshipwiththecompany. Thatis,thosedirectorsshouldreceivenocom-
pensation from the ﬁrm other than their director’s fee. The act also instructs
auditcommitteestoestablishformalproceduresforhandlingcomplaintsabout
17 United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs (2002).
18A summary of the act is found in Davis and Murray (2002).16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
accounting matters, whether the complaints come from inside or outside of
the ﬁrm. Finally, the committee must include a member who is a “ﬁnancial
expert,” as deﬁned by the SEC, or explain publicly why it has no such expert.
Likeitsattempttopromoteauditcommitteeindependence,theactcontains
provisions regarding a similar relationship between a ﬁrm and its auditor. A
number of these provisions are intended to keep the auditor from getting “too
close” to the ﬁrm. Hence, the act speciﬁes a number of nonaudit services that
an accounting ﬁrm may not provide to its audit clients. The act also requires
audit ﬁrms to rotate the lead partner responsible for a client at least once every
ﬁveyears. Further,theactcallsontheSECtostudythefeasibilityofrequiring
companies to periodically change their audit ﬁrm.
With regard to enforcement, the act includes both some new requirements
fortheSECinitsreviewofcompanyﬁlingsandthecreationofanewbody,the
Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board. The PCAOB is intended to be
anindependentsupervisorybodyfortheauditingindustrywithwhichallﬁrms
performing audits of public companies must register. This board is charged
with the task of establishing standards and rules governing the operation of
public accounting ﬁrms. As put forth in Sarbanes-Oxley, these standards
must include a minimum period of time over which audit workpapers must be
maintainedforpossibleexaminationbythePCAOB.Otherruleswouldinvolve
internal controls that audit ﬁrms must put in place to protect the quality and
integrity of their work.
Sarbanes-Oxley gives the PCAOB the task of inspecting audit ﬁrms on
a regular basis, with annual inspection required for the largest ﬁrms.19 In
addition to examining a ﬁrm’s compliance with rules regarding organization
and internal controls, inspections may include reviews of speciﬁc audit en-
gagements. The PCAOB may impose penalties that include ﬁnes as well as
the termination of an audit ﬁrm’s registration. Such termination would imply
a ﬁrm’s exit from the audit business.
In addition to creating the new board to supervise the audit industry, the
act gives the SEC greater responsibilities in reviewing disclosures by public
companies. TheactspellsoutfactorsthattheSECshoulduseinprioritizingits
reviews. Forinstance,ﬁrmsthathaveissuedmaterialrestatementsofﬁnancial
results or those whose stock prices have experienced signiﬁcant volatility
should receive priority treatment. Further, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that no
company be reviewed less than once every three years. Other sections of
the act that deal with enforcement prescribe penalties for speciﬁc abuses and
extend the statute of limitations for private securities fraud litigation.
The goal of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct is to alter the incentives of corporate
managements and their auditors so as to reduce the frequency of fraudulent
19 Firms preparing audit reports for more than one hundred companies per year will be in-
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ﬁnancial reporting. In evaluating the act, one can take this goal as given and
try to assess the act’s likely impact on actual behavior of market participants.
Alternatively, one could focus on the goal itself. The act is presumably based
on the belief that we currently have too much fraud in corporate disclosures.
But what is the right amount of fraud? Total elimination of fraud, if even
feasible, is unlikely to be economically desirable. As argued earlier, reducing
fraud is costly. It requires the expenditure of resources by some party to
evaluate the public statements of companies and a further resource cost to
impose consequences on those ﬁrms determined to have made false reports.
Reduction in fraud is only economically efﬁcient or desirable as long as the
incremental costs of enforcement are less than the social gain from improved
ﬁnancial reporting.
What are the social beneﬁts from improved credibility of corporate infor-
mation? A reduction in the perceived likelihood of fraud brings with it similar
beneﬁtstootherriskreductionsperceivedbyinvestors. Forexample,investors
become more willing to provide funds to corporations that issue public secu-
rities, resulting in a reduction in the cost of capital for those ﬁrms. Other
things being equal, improved credibility should also lead to more investment
by public companies and an overall expansion of the corporate sector. Again,
however, any such gain must be weighed against the corresponding costs.
Is there any reason to believe that a private market for corporate ﬁnance,
without any government intervention, would not result in an efﬁcient level
of corporate honesty? Economic theory suggests that the answer is no. It
is true that the production of information necessary to discover fraud has
some characteristics of a public good. For example, many people stand to
beneﬁt from an individual’s efforts in investigating a company. While public
goods can impede the efﬁciency of private market outcomes, the beneﬁts of
information production accrue to a well-deﬁned group of market participants
in this case. Companies subject to heightened investigative scrutiny enjoy
lower costs of capital.
In principle, one can imagine this type of investigative activity being un-
dertaken by a private membership organization. Companies that join would
voluntarily subject their accounting reports to close review. Failure to com-
ply with the organization’s standards could be punished with expulsion. This
organization could fund its activities through membership fees paid by the
participating companies. It would only attract members if the beneﬁts of
membership, in the form of reduced costs of capital, exceeded the cost of




in which the short-run gain from reporting false numbers would outweigh the
risk of discovery and expulsion.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Before the stock market crash of 1929, the New York Stock Exchange
was operating in some ways much like the hypothetical organization just de-
scribed. Investigations after the crash, which uncovered instances of mis-
leading or fraudulent reporting by issuers of securities, found relatively fewer
abusesamongcompaniesissuingstockontheNYSE.20 Onemightreasonably
conjecturethatthroughsuchinstitutionstheU.S.ﬁnancialmarketswouldhave
evolved into an efﬁcient set of arrangements for promoting corporate honesty.
While consideration of this possibility would make an interesting intellectual
exercise, it is not what happened. Instead, as often occurs in American poli-
tics, Congress responded to a crisis with the creation of a government entity.
In this case, a government entity charged with policing the behavior of com-
panies that issue public securities. The presence of such an agency might
well dilute private market participants’ incentives to engage in such policing
activities. If so, then reliance on the government substitutes for reliance on
private arrangements.
Have the SEC’s enforcement activities resulted in an efﬁcient level of
corporate honesty? This is a difﬁcult determination to make. It is true that
known cases of misreporting rose steadily in the 1980s and 1990s and that the
events of 2002 represented unprecedented levels of both the number and the
size of companies involved. It is also true that over the last two decades, as
activity in securities markets grew at a very rapid pace, growth in the SEC’s
budget lagged, limiting the resources available for the review of corporate
reports. In this sense, one might argue that the level of enforcement fell
during this period. Whether the current level of enforcement is efﬁcient or
not,theSarbanes-OxleyActexpressesCongress’sinterestinseeingheightened
enforcement so as to reduce the frequency of fraudulent reports.
How effective is Sarbanes-Oxley likely to be in changing the incentives
of corporations and their auditors? Many of the act’s provisions set rules and
standards for ways in which ﬁrms should behave or how they should organize
themselves and their relationships with auditors. There is reason to be skep-
tical about the likely effectiveness of these provisions by themselves. These
portions of the act mandate that certain things be done inside an issuing ﬁrm,
for instance, in the organization of the audit committee. But because these
actions and organizational changes take place inside the ﬁrm, they are subject
to the same information problems as all corporate behavior. It is inherently
difﬁcult for outsiders, whether market participants or government agencies,
to know what goes on inside the ﬁrm. The monitoring required to gain this
information is costly, and it is unlikely that mandates for changed behavior
will have much effect without an increase in the allocation of resources for
such monitoring of corporate actions, relationships, and reports.
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Other parts of the act appear to call for this increase in the allocation
of resources for monitoring activities, both by the SEC and by the newly
createdPCAOB.Togetherwiththeact’sprovisionsconcerningpenalties,these
portions should have a real effect on incentives and behavior. Further, to the
extent that these agencies monitor ﬁrms’ adherence to the general rules and
standards speciﬁed in the act, monitoring will give force to those provisions.
If the goal of the act is to reduce the likelihood of events like Enron and
WorldCom, however, monitoring might best be applied to the actual review
of corporate reports and accounting ﬁrms’ audit engagements. Ultimately,
such direct review of ﬁrms’ reports and audit workpapers is the activity that
identiﬁes misbehavior. Uncovering and punishing misbehavior is, in turn, the
most certain means of altering incentives.
Incentives for deceptive accounting will never be eliminated, and even
a ﬁrm that follows all of the formal rules in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will
ﬁnd a way to be deceptive if the expected payoff is big enough. Among
the things done by the SEC and PCAOB, the payoff to deception is most
effectively limited by the allocation of resources to direct review of reported
performance and by bringing penalties to bear where appropriate. Any hope
that a real change in corporate behavior can be attained without incurring
the costs of paying closer attention to the actual reporting behavior of ﬁrms
willlikelyleadtodisappointment. Corporatediscipline, whetherfrommarket
forcesorgovernmentintervention,ariseswhenpeopleoutsideoftheﬁrmincur
the costs necessary to learn some of what insiders know.
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